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WHAT’S A FEDERALIST TO DO?
THE IMPENDING CLASH BETWEEN
TEXTUALISM AND FEDERALISM IN STATE
CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING SUITS
UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 4
C. BRYAN WILSON
INTRODUCTION
Although each member of the United States House of
Representatives must stand for reelection every two years, the
number of competitive races is in fact quite low.1 In 2004, experts
predict fewer than forty close House races out of the 435 total seats
2
on the ballot across the country. From the beginning of the current

Copyright © 2004 by C. Bryan Wilson.
1. See Theodore J. Lowi, President v. Congress: What the Two-Party Duopoly Has Done
to the American Separation of Powers, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1219, 1232–33 (1997) (“In 1986,
1988 and 1990, 98 percent of congressional incumbents who sought re-election were successful.
In 1992, . . . 95 percent of incumbents seeking re-election were successful; and in 1994, despite
the earthquake producing the first two-House Republican majorities in 42 years, incumbent reelection rate was 91 percent.”); Erin P. Billings, Democrats Urged to Seek More Targets In
Effort to Take Back House Majority, ROLL CALL, Feb. 3, 2003, available at LEXIS, Legis
Library, Rollcl File (“Since 1998 . . . roughly 40 house seats—less than 10 percent of the overall
body—have been truly competitive and closely contested by the parties.”); see also Stephen
Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Jr., Soft Money, Hard Money, Strong Parties, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 598, 608 (2000) (listing some of the complaints about the lack of competitive congressional
elections, including “the high incumbent reelection rate (averaging over 95 percent since 1980);
the ‘vanishing marginals’; the incumbency advantage in vote-share, around 8 percent; and the
huge advantage incumbents have in fundraising”) (citations omitted).
2. See Stuart Rothenberg, Less Is More in ‘04: DCCC Should Narrow, Not Expand, Target
List, ROLL CALL, July 21, 2003, available at LEXIS, Legis Library, Rollcl File (noting that
“savvy Democratic insiders believe that their party should focus on no more than 15 to 20
Republican-held and soon-to-be-open House districts” to have any legitimate chance to reduce
the GOP House majority); The Few, The Not So Proud; It’s Hard to Find Vulnerable House
Incumbents This Cycle, ROLL CALL, Nov. 10, 2003, available at LEXIS, Legis Library, Rollcl
File (“The decennial redistricting process left so few competitive House districts that it has
become considerably more difficult to compile [Roll Call’s] traditional 10 most vulnerable
House incumbents list.”); Lauren W. Whittington, House Outlook; Even if There Is an AntiRepublican Wave in 2004, Democrats May Not Be Able to Ride It to Shore, ROLL CALL, Nov. 10,
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constitutional system, redistricting has taken place every ten years,
3
following the census. However, today, in some states redistricting
battles are waged every year.4 Contributing to this increase in
litigation, redistricting law is nebulous and courts have been willing to
5
play substantial roles in redistricting disputes. The explosion of
redistricting litigation highlights a conflict between two seemingly
compatible schools of constitutional interpretation—federalism and
textualism—that must eventually be resolved by the Supreme Court.
This conflict, as shown through a recent dispute over the
interpretation of the word “legislature” in Article I, Section 4 of the
United States Constitution, is the focus of this Note.
On its face, Article I, Section 4 grants state legislatures authority
to redistrict their states’ respective congressional districts. This power
is limited by Congress, which can impose rules and regulations on the
states’ redistricting. The pertinent part of Article I, Section 4 reads,
2003, available at LEXIS, Legis Library, Rollcl File (“Although party leaders and strategists
routinely cite a 40-seat battleground of targeted races in 2004, Democrats had fewer than a
dozen challengers who were raising money in these districts at the end of September
[2003] . . . .”).
3. For a general overview of the history of redistricting, see 2 CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY, GUIDE TO CONGRESS 900–11 (5th ed. 2000). See also Alison Mitchell,
Redistricting 2002 Produces No Great Shake-Ups, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2002, at A20 (“While
the trend toward fewer competitive House races has been building for decades, political analysts
generally rely on the reconfiguration of House lines every 10 years to provide an initial period
of ferment and more political opportunity.”).
4. The very narrow margin by which the Republicans control the House, see CONG. Q.,
POLITICS IN AMERICA 2004: THE 108TH CONGRESS v (David Hawkings & Brian Nuttig eds.,
2003), combined with the dearth of competitive seats, makes the political stakes too high to wait
a whole decade to redraw the congressional lines whenever a party seizes control of the state
process. See David M. Halbfinger, Across U.S., Redistricting as a Never-Ending Battle, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 2003, at A1 (discussing impending votes on new redistricting plans in Texas and
Colorado, with the possibility of additional votes in Illinois, California, and Oklahoma).
5. See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, You Don’t Have to Be a Liberal to Hate the Racial
Gerrymandering Cases, 50 STAN. L. REV. 779, 825 (1998) (“Because the states are left with little
or no margin of error in an area where the legal standards are neither clear nor stable, there will
almost certainly be an increase in litigation and, as a result, increased intervention into the
states’ representational politics by federal judges.”); see also Samuel Isaacharoff,
Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 638–39 (2002):
First, now that the post-1990 round of redistricting litigation has concluded, there
is every reason to suspect that future redistricting fights will be framed in the
inflammatory language of race to increase the possibility of subsequent judicial
revision. . . .
The second, and more salient, detrimental incentive the Court established was
that opponents of the post-1990 districts had to construct their racial challenges after
the fact, once Shaw I had given a green light to such claims. Imagine the effect on
redistricting debates in the post-2000 round now that any salting of the record with
racial issues may enhance the prospects of judicial oversight . . . .
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“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
6
Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.” One of the
foremost limitations on many states’ ability to redistrict is the Voting
Rights Act.7 Although this law is both lengthy and complicated,
basically it limits state action in applicable states by prohibiting any
change in voting procedures (including voter eligibility requirements
and the location of polling places) without prior approval (or
preclearance) from the Department of Justice or an appropriate
three-judge panel.8 This requirement, combined with the Supreme
Court’s recent Equal Protection jurisprudence,9 which prohibits racial
gerrymandering in redistricting, has led to substantial litigation
centering on the redistricting process in states subject to the Act.
Through the court system, this process illustrates an ongoing source
of tension between federal and state authorities: states must receive
permission from the federal government to alter their districts, and
they can be haled into federal court to defend their conduct. In the
current political environment, the stakes of this political tug-of-war
are high.10
A recent case introduced a new constitutional battleground in
this struggle: the interpretation of the word “legislature” in Article I,
11
Section 4. In Branch v. Smith, a federal district court introduced a
novel constitutional theory that a state chancery court had no
jurisdiction to redraw the state’s congressional districts. The court
viewed Article I, Section 4 as allowing only the state legislature to
draw the congressional districts; absent express authority from the
legislative body, the state court could not do so.12 This theory served
as the “alternative” holding of the three-judge district court.13 The
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
7. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973bb-1 (2000)). Note that only some states (and some parts of states) are
subject to the requirements of the Voting Rights Act. See infra note 42 for a brief discussion of
the jurisdictions covered.
8. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 44–47 and accompanying text.
10. See supra note 4.
11. Smith v. Clark (Smith II), 189 F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D. Miss. 2002), aff’d sub nom. Branch
v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 1429 (2003). For clarity, the case will be referred to as Branch throughout
this Note, whether discussing the district court’s opinion or the Supreme Court’s.
12. Id. at 550.
13. Id. at 549.
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court independently invalidated the redistricting plan for violating
Section Five of the Voting Rights Act for failing the “timely
14
preclearance” requirement. Subsequently, the Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court on the latter ground, avoiding the
15
constitutional issue. This Note explores Branch’s alternative holding
and the interpretive problems it creates between federalist and
textualist constitutional interpretations, resolving the impending
collision in favor of federalism and state courts.16
17
The alternative holding of Branch is flawed. In light of
interpretations of Article I, Section 4 and case law like Growe v.
18
Emison, which encouraged federal courts to defer to state
19
redistricting efforts, it seems clear that reapportioning congressional
districts is a state function subject to numerous federal safeguards,
principally the Voting Rights Act and the Constitution.20 Also,
adherence to the overarching tenets of the Constitution requires

14. Id. A three-judge district court panel heard Branch pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a)
(2000), which directs redistricting disputes to these somewhat rare federal district courts.
Decisions of these three-judge panels proceed directly to the Supreme Court of the United
States. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2000).
15. See Branch, 123 S. Ct. at 1437 (“Since we affirm the injunction on the basis of the
District Court’s principal stated ground that the state-court plan had not been precleared and
had no prospect of being precleared in time for the 2002 election, we have no occasion to
address the District Court’s alternative holding that the State Chancery Court’s redistricting
plan was unconstitutional . . . and therefore we vacate it as a basis for the injunction.”).
16. This illustrates some of the differences between two schools of interpretation
frequently viewed as highly similar and endorsed by the “New Federalists” of the Rehnquist
Court. Additionally, this issue may serve to demonstrate how the two schools of thought work
in tandem to find the true meaning of the Constitution. See John Duffy, Federalism Revived?
The Printz and City of Boerne Decisions, Address Before the Federalism and Separation of
Powers Practice Group Panel of The Federalist Society (Oct. 17, 1997), at http://www.fedsoc.org/Publications/practicegroupnewsletters/federalism/fd020103.htm (on file with the Duke
Law Journal):
[T]his enterprise—interpreting the enumerated powers with care—is a textually
rigorous way to protect federalism. . . . [A]ll true Federalists [should] . . . embrace the
Court’s rediscovered enterprise of interpreting the congressional powers faithfully
and to think of decisions like Printz, New York v. United States, and City of Boerne,
not as cases based solely on ‘underlying postulates’ of federalism, but as based on the
textual limits of congressional power.
(emphasis added).
17. The Article I, Section 4 argument is novel because most of the recent redistricting
litigation and Supreme Court jurisprudence has focused on the Equal Protection clause and the
Voting Rights Act. See infra notes 38–48 and accompanying text.
18. 507 U.S. 25 (1993).
19. Id. at 33; see infra notes 117–119, 129–132 and accompanying text.
20. Cf. Growe, 507 U.S. at 34 (“[T]he doctrine of Germano prefers both state branches
[legislative and judicial] to federal courts as agents of apportionment.”).
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21
federal courts to stay their hand before invading the states’ province
in creating congressional districts. Accordingly, in the spirit of comity
and federalism, federal courts should not strip state courts of
jurisdiction over redistricting cases, even if the state courts physically
redraw the districts after finding a constitutional infirmity. Branch’s
alternative holding is incorrect because the Mississippi constitution
gave the chancery court authority, albeit attenuated, to redistrict the
state.22 Although the United States Constitution trumps all other
concerns, it cannot be read in a vacuum: Article I, Section 4 “imposes
a duty” on states to draw congressional lines much like Article II,
Section 1 requires states to appoint electors for president and vice
president.23 For this reason, if a state legislature is unable to perform
this task, a state court should be given a reasonable opportunity to act
on the state’s behalf. The legislative scheme should receive priority; if
the state court determines, in accordance with state law, that the
legislature cannot accomplish this goal, the court may use its
equitable powers to do so. Only if the state court lacks all authority to
draw congressional districts under Article I, Section 4, or threatens its
citizens’ constitutional rights by refusing to do so, should a federal
court intervene.
Part I of this Note briefly discusses the pertinent legal challenges
to congressional redistricting plans and the constitutional issue raised
in Branch v. Smith. It then introduces the jurisprudential tension

21. See Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407, 409 (1965) (“We believe the District Court should
have stayed its hand. The power of the judiciary of a State to require valid reapportionment or
to formulate a valid redistricting plan has not only been recognized by this Court but
appropriate action by the States in such cases has been specifically encouraged.”).
22. Mississippi state courts have jurisdiction over “[a]ll matters in equity.” MISS. CONST.
art. 6, § 159. Additionally, the Mississippi Supreme Court specifically held that the chancery
court at issue had jurisdiction over this case. In re Mauldin, No. 2001-M-01891 (Miss. Dec. 13,
2001), cited and quoted in Smith v. Clark (Smith II), 189 F. Supp. 2d 548, 557 (S.D. Miss. 2002),
vacated by Mauldin v. Branch, 866 So.2d 429 (Miss. 2003). In Branch, the three-judge panel
conceded that the state supreme court had ruled specifically in the chancery court’s favor on this
point, but dismissed the holding partially because “[t]he court did not provide any basis for its
holding, did not refer to its earlier cases to the contrary, and did not point to any legislative
authority that authorized the chancery court to act.” Smith II, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 557.
However, it is important—and an interesting political point—to note that the
Mississippi Supreme Court later vacated the opinion on which both the district court and United
States Supreme Court relied in Branch. See Mauldin v. Branch, 866 So.2d 429 (Miss. 2003)
(“[C]hancery courts lack jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes over congressional redistricting.”).
23. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (noting that “there
are a few exceptional cases in which the Constitution imposes a duty or confers a power on a
particular branch of state government” in discussing Article I, Section 2); see also U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 1, cl. 2; infra notes 70–78 and accompanying text.
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24
between these two interpretations of the issue. Part II examines the
textual approach to Article I, Section 4. Part III evaluates Article I,
Section 4 in a broader, federalist sense. The conclusion offers a
resolution to the conflict between the two interpretations and urges
federal courts to avoid the temptation of invoking Article I, Section 4
to seize control of the redistricting process from the states.

I. BACKGROUND
This Part of the Note focuses on the typical constitutional
challenges to redistricting plans, including a brief discussion of the
major cases and statutory provisions at issue. Additionally, this Part
introduces the scant case law interpreting Article I, Section 4 of the
United States Constitution, and focuses on Article II, Section 1 of the
Constitution, which the Supreme Court views as “parallel” to Article
I, Section 4.25 Finally, this Part establishes the conceptual framework
examined more thoroughly in Parts II and III.
A. General Redistricting Requirements and Legal Challenges
Ever since Baker v. Carr,26 when the Supreme Court held that
redistricting schemes no longer present nonjusticiable political
27
questions, significant litigation has accompanied the redistricting
process. For better or worse, almost every new round of redistricting
28
involves litigation. Litigation is almost perpetual in some states,
where new lines must be drawn even before existing redistricting
cases are resolved.29
24. Obviously, there are numerous ways of interpreting the Constitution. This Note focuses
only on textualism and federalism for two reasons. First, these two views of the constitution are
important for determining how the Supreme Court might decide redistricting cases. Second, this
focus highlights the tension between two schools of interpretation that frequently reach the
same conclusions.
25. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 804–05 (1995); see infra notes 68–78
and accompanying text.
26. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
27. Id. at 209.
28. See Isaacharoff, supra note 5.
29. Both Texas and North Carolina, for example, had ongoing redistricting litigation
throughout the 1990s that never resulted in a permanent, constitutional apportionment plan.
See, e.g., infra notes 45, 47 (discussing some of this litigation).
This cycle is about to intensify, as states attempt to redistrict every year (not just every
ten years). See Halbfinger, supra note 4, at A1 (discussing impending votes on new redistricting
plans in Texas and Colorado, with the possibility of additional votes in Illinois, California, and
Oklahoma, despite the fact that each of these states passed new congressional district maps
immediately following the 2000 census). Courts disagree over whether state legislatures have
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The Constitution mandates reapportionment of congressional
30
seats after every decennial census. There are two main aspects to
reapportionment: (1) determining how many congressional
31
representatives each state will receive, and (2) redrawing the actual
district lines within each state. Congress determines part one,32 and
the states have responsibility for part two.33 Although the
constitutional authority vested in the states is broad, they are subject
34
to congressional regulations like the Voting Rights Act.
Additionally, states must conform to other constitutional
35
requirements such as the “one person, one vote” principle. Beyond
these limitations, however, states are free to redistrict themselves as
they see fit. In fact, state legislatures have so much authority in this
process—and can thereby affect the congressional agenda by favoring
one party’s incumbents over another’s—that the national parties pay
close attention to state legislative elections preceding redistricting
years.36 By stacking the deck in favor of one party or another in key
the right to redistrict every year. Compare People ex. rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221,
1240 (Colo. 2003) (“[T]he framers of the Colorado Constitution intended that congressional
districts must only be drawn once per decade.”), with Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 457
(E.D. Tex. 2004) (“We . . . reject Plaintiffs’ argument that the Texas Legislature lacked
authority to draw new districts after a federal court drew them following the 2000 census.”).
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
31. See id. Of course the Fourteenth Amendment repealed the first line of this clause, striking
the offensive “three-fifths compromise” from the nation’s governing document. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 2 (“Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State . . . .”).
32. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (“Representatives shall be apportioned among the
several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in
each State, excluding Indians not taxed.”).
33. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof . . . .”);
Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 364–67 (1932) (including reapportionment as part of the “manner”
in which states determine how to conduct elections).
34. See infra notes 38–43 and accompanying text.
35. This general principle is derived from several Supreme Court cases. See Kirkpatrick v.
Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 527–28 (1969) (“[A]s nearly as is practicable one man’s vote in a
congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s.” (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376
U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964))); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (“[A]n individual’s right to vote
for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion
diluted when compared with votes of citizens living in other parts of the State.”).
36. See Steven Hill, Behind Closed Doors: The Recurring Plague of Redistricting and the
Politics of Geography, 91 NAT’L CIVIC REV. 317, 325 (2002) (“In fact, numerous observers have
stated that the outcome of the 1994 elections, when Republicans took control of Congress for
the first time in forty years, was due in no small part to Republican gains made during the 1991–
92 redistricting.”); DCCC Cries Foul Over NRCC Contribution to Schrock, BULL.’S
FRONTRUNNER, June 27, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, Frntrn File (“The NRCC
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states, state legislatures can alter the makeup of the House of
Representatives and subsequently alter the national agenda
emanating from the House. In this way, redistricting can have
national implications. However, in America’s dual federal system, a
state’s right to compose its own congressional districts is also of vital
importance to the state’s own sovereignty.37
The Voting Rights Act38 often provides the primary mechanism
for challenging redistricting schemes. This law, enacted to enforce the
39
Fifteenth Amendment, sets forth numerous requirements that states
(and parts of states) covered by the law must meet before making any
changes to their election laws.40 The impetus behind the Voting

[National Republican Congressional Campaign Committee, whose goal is to elect Republicans
to the U.S. House of Representatives] ‘says it poured more than $700,000 into Virginia
Republican party and campaign committees in 1999 for state races and party building, in part to
influence federal and state legislative redistricting next year.’”); Kathy Kiely & Jim Drinkard,
The Hidden Election, USA TODAY, Jan. 4, 2000, at A1 (chronicling the actions of the national
political parties, particularly their congressional campaign committees, as they prepared to
spend millions on state legislative elections in 2000—the last election year before the most
recent census and mandatory reapportionment).
In fact, the national parties also pay close attention to control of the state legislative
redistricting process. The reason is simple: if the state legislative lines are politically
gerrymandered, a given party will then control the statehouse. The party in control of the
statehouse will in turn gerrymander the state to favor that party’s congressional candidates. See
Leslie Wayne, National Parties Donate to State Races, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1998, at A24:
Mr. Blackwell, the [Republican] State Treasurer in Ohio, said Republicans gave
him additional money [for his Secretary of State campaign] after he decided not to
oppose Mr. Taft in a [Republican] primary [for governor]. The party also contributed
to his campaign because, as secretary of state, Mr. Blackwell would cast one of the
five votes on the state reapportionment board, which draws the districts for the state
Legislature. State lawmakers, in turn, draw the map for the United States House
districts.
37. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915 (1995) (“Federal-court review of districting
legislation represents a serious intrusion on the most vital of local functions.”).
38. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973bb-1 (2000)).
39. H.R. REP. NO. 89-439 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2437.
40. The two main sources of litigation under the Voting Rights Act are from sections 2 and
5. Section 2 reads, “[n]o voting . . . procedure shall be . . . applied by any State or political
subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race . . . or in contravention of the guarantees set forth
[elsewhere in the Act].” Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a). See Thornburg v.
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986) (“Congress substantially revised § 2 to make clear that a
violation could be proved by showing discriminatory effect alone and to establish as the relevant
legal standard the ‘results test’ . . . .”). Section 2 can be used to require majority-minority
districts where minority communities have been pulled out of majority-minority districts to
benefit white incumbents. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 153 (1993) (“Dividing the
minority group among various districts so that it is a majority in none may prevent the group
from electing its candidate of choice . . . .”). For a discussion of Section 5, see infra note 43.
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Rights Act was the desire to prevent states from disenfranchising
41
minority voters by denying their right to vote or diluting their votes.
The Act requires some states and parts of states, primarily in the
42
South, to preclear any change of electoral plans with the United
States Department of Justice or the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia.43
Equal Protection challenges to state redistricting plans,44 a more
recent development, have become an additional source of litigation.45
According to the most recent Supreme Court pronouncement on the
matter, race considerations can be used in redistricting schemes as
long as they are not the “predominant factor.”46 If race is the

41. Previous attempts at enforcing voting rights laws encountered “serious obstacles in
various regions of the country,” prompting support of the Voting Rights Act. H.R. REP. NO. 89439 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437, 2441. See also id. at 2484–85 (statement of Rep.
Cahill) (“If there are any doubts of the need for federal legislation in this field, an examination
of the report [of the U.S. Commission of Civil Rights] and its account of intimidation, reprisal,
interference, and violence will, I submit, be most convincing.”).
42. See Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (establishing the formula for
determining which jurisdictions are subject to the preclearance requirement); Procedures for the
Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 28 C.F.R. pt. 51, app. (2003)
(listing jurisdictions subject to the preclearance requirement); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Easing
the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After the Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1569, 1587 n.87 (2002):
Basically the formula looks at two factors: whether, on one of three specified dates, a
jurisdiction conditioned the right to vote by imposing a literacy ‘test or device’ . . . and
whether, on that date, either less than fifty percent of the persons of voting age were
registered to vote or less than fifty percent of such persons voted in the presidential
election.
43. See Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (2000) (requiring preclearance
by any “covered jurisdiction” seeking to implement a new “standard, practice, or procedure
with respect to voting”); Scope of Requirement, 28 C.F.R. § 51.12 (2003) (requiring
preclearance of “[a]ny change affecting voting,” no matter how minor); see also Beer v. United
States, 425 U.S. 130, 140–41 (1976) (requiring the submitting state to prove that the change
would neither “lead to a retrogression in the [political] position of racial minorities” nor have a
racially discriminatory purpose or effect).
44. These challenges build on Wesberry v. Sanders and Reynolds v. Sims. See supra note 35.
45. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno (Shaw I), 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993) (holding that appellants
“state[d] a claim under the Equal Protection Clause” to challenge North Carolina’s redistricting
scheme); Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw II), 517 U.S. 899, 902 (1996) (deciding that the plan at issue in
Shaw I did in fact violate the Equal Protection Clause); Hunt v. Cromartie (Cromartie I), 526
U.S. 541, 551–552 (1999) (reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the
challengers because the state had a nonracial motive for the redistricting plan, which created an
issue of triable fact); Easley v. Cromartie (Cromartie II), 532 U.S. 234, 237 (2001) (reversing the
district court’s conclusion that North Carolina violated the Equal Protection Clause in drawing
its congressional district boundaries).
46. See Cromartie II, 532 U.S. at 249 (“[T]he Constitution does not place an affirmative
obligation upon the legislature to avoid creating districts that turn out to be heavily, even

071604 WILSON.DOC

1376

9/17/2004 2:04 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:1367

predominant factor behind a redistricting scheme, strict scrutiny
47
applies. In the past, courts have assumed that state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction over legal challenges to redistricting plans
48
under the Voting Rights Act and the Constitution. However, this
49
assumption is now under attack.
Branch arose following the 2000 census, when the Mississippi
legislature failed to pass a redistricting plan for the state’s
50
congressional districts. Lawsuits were filed in both state and federal
51
court. A state chancery court asserted jurisdiction and began the
process of redrawing the state’s congressional districts.52 Even though
the state supreme court upheld the chancery court’s jurisdiction,53
opponents challenged the chancery court’s decision in federal court
on two grounds: (1) that the chancery court’s plan could not be
majority, minority. It simply imposes an obligation not to create such districts for predominantly
racial, as opposed to political or traditional, districting motivations.”).
47. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 653. The details of both the Voting Rights Act and the Shaw
progeny are outside the scope of this Note, but they are pertinent as the source of most
redistricting litigation. One reason for frequent litigation in this area is that standards are very
difficult to ascertain. For a discussion of the Voting Rights Act, Shaw, and the current state of
the law, see Robinson O. Everett, Redistricting in North Carolina: A Personal Perspective, 79
N.C. L. REV. 1301, 1327 (2001) (discussing the original Shaw case and the effects on the decision
by the Court’s most recent pronouncement, Hunt v. Cromartie II, 532 U.S. 234 (2001), and
expressing disappointment that the Court failed to “provide an incentive for abandoning racial
gerrymanders, rather than disguising them”); Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time:
Reapportionment After the 2000 Census, 50 STAN. L. REV. 731 (1998) (discussing the state of the
law and predicting challenges that will arise in the wake of the 2000 census). See also id. at 758–
62 (elaborating upon the extent of state courts’ involvement in this process); Robert F. Kravetz,
Recent Decision, Where Race and Political Behavior Highly Correlate Within a Congressional
District, it is Unlikely that the District Will be Held to be an Unconstitutional Racial
Gerrymander: Easley v. Cromartie, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 561 (2002) (discussing Cromartie and its
implications).
48. See, e.g., Adams County Election Comm’n v. Sanders, 586 So. 2d 829, 831 (Miss. 1991)
(“[S]tate courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts to decide whether § 5 of the
Voting Rights Act applies to contemplated changes in election procedures . . . . [but] state courts
may not actually grant pre-clearance [to an apportionment plan].”).
49. See Smith v. Clark (Smith II), 189 F. Supp. 2d 548, 558 (S.D. Miss. 2002) (finding that
the chancery court does not have jurisdiction over redistricting matters unless it was granted by
the Mississippi state legislature).
50. Branch v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 1429, 1433 (2003).
51. Id. at 1433–34.
52. Id. at 1434.
53. In re Mauldin, No. 2001-M-01891 (Miss. Dec. 13, 2001), vacated by Mauldin v. Branch,
866 So.2d 429 (Miss. 2003). The fact that the state supreme court later vacated this decision is
irrelevant in considering the Branch litigation for purposes of this Note. See supra note 22. The
vacation of In re Mauldin occurred well after the federal litigation discussed here; additionally,
this Note focuses primarily on the theoretical issues raised by Branch and not the case itself. See
infra note 57.
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54

precleared in time for primary elections because preclearance would
be needed for both the plan itself and for the chancery court’s
jurisdiction to redistrict the state;55 and (2) that the chancery court
lacked jurisdiction to reapportion the congressional districts under
56
Article I, Section 4 of the Federal Constitution. The district court
ruled in favor of the challengers on both issues, rejecting the chancery
57
court’s plan and redrawing the congressional districts itself.
B. Article I, Section 4
The Constitution gives states authority through their legislatures
to determine the “Times, Places and Manner” of congressional
elections.58 Redistricting fits within this clause as part of the “manner”
of holding elections for the House of Representatives.59
There is very little case law interpreting the meaning of
60
“Legislature” in Article I, Section 4. In Davis v. Hildebrant, the
Court permitted a citizen initiative, as authorized by the state
constitution, to reapportion the state’s districts, stating, “so far as the
State had the power to [reapportion], the referendum constituted a
part of the state constitution and laws and was contained within the
legislative power.”61 The Court also invoked a state constitution in

54. See supra note 43.
55. Smith v. Clark (Smith I), 189 F. Supp. 2d 503, 507–08 (S.D. Miss. 2002). The district
court viewed the chancery court’s grant of jurisdiction as “a change in Mississippi’s election
procedures that must be precleared by federal authorities pursuant to § 5 of the Voting Rights
Act” because previous decisions of the state supreme court, Brumfield v. Brock, 142 So. 745
(Miss. 1932) and Wood v. State, 142 So. 747 (Miss. 1932), held that the chancery courts lacked
jurisdiction over disputes relating to congressional redistricting plans. Smith I, 189 F. Supp. 2d at
507–08. However, these cases were decided well before Baker v. Carr. See supra notes 26–27
and accompanying text.
56. Smith II, 189 F. Supp. 2d at 558–59.
57. Id. Deeper examination of the facts underlying this case seems unnecessary for this
Note, which focuses on the court’s alternative holding. For a more thorough analysis of the facts
of Branch, see Jonathan H. Steinberg & Aimee Dudovitz, Branch v. Smith—Election Law
Federalism after Bush v. Gore: Are State Courts Unconstitutional Interlopers in Congressional
Redistricting?, 2 ELECTION L.J. 91 (2003).
58. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2.
59. See supra note 33. However, some courts believe that the states’ reapportionment
authority comes from Article I, § 2 alone. See O’Lear v. Miller, 222 F. Supp. 2d 850, 859 (2002),
aff’d mem., 123 S. Ct. 512 (2002) (citing Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 6 (1964), for the
proposition that “[Article I, Section 2] governs intrastate redistricting” and limiting Article I,
Section 4 to “the Supreme Court’s admonition that states may not use section 4 to ‘immunize’
action that would otherwise be unconstitutional”).
60. 241 U.S. 565 (1916).
61. Id. at 568.
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62
Smiley v. Holm, requiring the Minnesota legislature to act, subject to
the governor’s veto.63 Justice Hughes found that the state legislature’s
“exercise of . . . authority must be in accordance with the method
64
which the State has prescribed for legislative enactments.” In
addition to the paucity of Supreme Court precedent, few lower courts
have interpreted this part of the Constitution.65
In light of the scant case law on the issue, Judge Jolly in Branch
viewed the act of redrawing the congressional districts as a lawmaking
role; and, even though the legislature itself is not required to draw the
lines, he stated that any entity that undertakes that act must “find the
source of its power to redistrict in some act of the legislature.”66 The
Branch court found no statute or grant of legislative authority
permitting the chancery court to redraw the state’s congressional
districts, and thus determined that the chancery court’s action had
67
violated Article I, Section 4.
The Supreme Court has viewed the duty imposed by Article I,
Section 4 as “parallel” to the duty of states under Article II, Section 1,
68
Clause 2 of the Constitution, which reads in part, “Each State shall
appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a
Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the
Congress . . . .”69 Needless to say, Article II, Section 1 has received
70
considerable attention from scholars in the wake of Bush v. Gore.

62. 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
63. Id. at 369.
64. Id. at 367.
65. One court held that Article I, Section 4 empowered only the state legislature, and
rejected a state election board’s effort to reapportion the state. See Grills v. Branigin, 284 F.
Supp. 176, 180 (S.D. Ind. 1968), aff’d per curiam, 391 U.S. 364 (1968) (“This power [to redistrict]
is granted to the Indiana General Assembly and the Election Board does not possess the
legislative power under the Indiana Constitution nor does it possess judicial power under the
Indiana Constitution.”).
66. Smith v. Clark (Smith II), 189 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550 (S.D. Miss. 2002).
67. Id. But see In re Mauldin, No. 2001-M-01891 (Miss. Dec. 13, 2001) (finding jurisdiction),
vacated, Mauldin v. Branch, 866 So. 2d 429 (2003) (holding that the chancery court had no
jurisdiction over the case).
68. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 804–05 (1995) (viewing the two
clauses as “parallel” and as “express delegations of power to the States to act with respect to
federal elections”).
69. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
70. 531 U.S. 98 (2000); see, e.g., Richard Epstein, “In such Manner as the Legislature
Thereof May Direct”: The Outcome of Bush v. Gore Defended, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 613, 634
(2001) (defending the Rehnquist concurrence as the best rationale for the outcome of the case);
Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 637, 651–52 (2001) (arguing that the
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This controversial case may provide insight into how the Court could
approach the Article I, Section 4 issue. In Bush v. Gore, the Supreme
Court held that Florida violated the Equal Protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment by relying on an inadequate and unfair vote71
counting method. More significantly for this Note, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, also asserted that
the Florida Supreme Court had no authority to adjudicate the case
before it.72 Under Article II, Section 1 of the United States
Constitution, the Florida legislature had the sole authority to choose
73
the state’s presidential electors. Therefore, the concurring justices
would have altogether prevented the Florida Supreme Court from
infringing upon the legislature’s expressly granted authority—in this
case, the (perceived) statutory mandate that the Florida Division of
Elections not, under any circumstances, miss the federal “safe
harbor” for delivering the state’s votes to Congress.74 Justice Stevens
strongly disagreed, arguing that the Florida Supreme Court had the
75
sole authority to interpret Florida’s laws. In light of controlling
precedent, Stevens believed that the state court’s jurisdiction was
both “consistent with, and indeed contemplated by, the grant of
authority in Article II.”76
If the Rehnquist concurrence in Bush v. Gore is persuasive, state
courts may indeed have no jurisdiction over redistricting matters: like
the decisionmaking process for presidential electors, the
determination of congressional districts could be an “exceptional
case[] in which the Constitution imposes a duty or confers a power on
77
a particular branch of a State’s government.” In contrast, if Justice
Constitution and statutory scheme left the final decision to Congress and that the Supreme
Court should not have enforced the “safe harbor” provision of 3 U.S.C. § 5); Laurence H. Tribe,
Erog .v Hsub and Its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 170 (2001) (arguing that the Article I rationale constituted only a “red herring,” that the
Fourteenth Amendment grounds for the decision were a “shell game,” and that the entire case
was a nonjusticiable political question).
71. 531 U.S. at 110.
72. See id. at 111–22 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
73. Id. at 113 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
74. Id. at 114 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). The concurrence found that the Florida
Supreme Court’s remedy jeopardized the legislature’s desire to use the safe harbor provided by
3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000). Id. at 120–21 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
75. See id. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (remarking that although “on rare occasions . . .
federal judicial intervention in state elections” may be appropriate, Bush v. Gore did “not
[present] such an occasion”).
76. Id. at 124 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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Stevens’ view is persuasive, then Article I, Section 4, like Article II,
views state legislatures in their “lawmaking capacity.” The legislature
would be subject to ordinary judicial review within the state
constitutional structure. Bush v. Gore can be distinguished because
the state redistricting process may not rise to the “exceptional” level
of selecting presidential electors.78 Additionally, even if one agrees
with Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court’s holding refers
only to the selection of presidential electors, meaning that it cannot
serve as controlling precedent for cases like Branch.
Compounding the problem is the Court’s recent view of statefederal relations. Decisions like New York v. United States,79 Printz v.
80
81
United States, and National League of Cities v. Usery underscore the
Rehnquist majority’s willingness to protect the integrity of states from
intrusion by the federal government. Additionally, cases like United
States v. Lopez82 and United States v. Morrison83 have made the
Rehnquist Court famous for appreciating the separation of state
responsibilities from federal responsibilities. In this respect, the
78. However, this distinction is not particularly strong. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 803–04 (1995) (recognizing that members of Congress are federal
officeholders, not solely representatives of the state).
79. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). In this case, the Court held that the federal government cannot
“commandeer” state governments into advancing federal regulatory aims because doing so
“would . . . be inconsistent with the Constitution’s division of authority between federal and
state governments.” Id. at 175.
80. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). In Printz, the Court held that the federal government could not
require local law enforcement officers to enforce part of the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act. See id. at 933 (“[T]he obligation [imposed on ‘chief law enforcement officers’ by
18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (2000)] to ‘make a reasonable effort to ascertain within 5 business days
whether receipt or possession [of a handgun] would be in violation of the law’ . . . is
unconstitutional.”). Central to this holding was the belief that the Constitution allows the
federal government power to regulate only “individuals, not states.” Id. at 920 (quoting New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 166).
81. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528 (1985). In National League of Cities, Justice Rehnquist provided an early look at the
jurisprudence that the Court under his leadership would later produce; his opinion looked to
history, federalist principles, and “undoubted attribute[s] of state sovereignty” in recognizing,
on Tenth Amendment grounds, that states are exempt from certain provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. 426 U.S. at 845.
82. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). In Lopez, the Court invalidated part of the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990 for violating the Commerce Clause. See id. at 551. In his majority opinion,
Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized the importance of maintaining a “distinction between what
is truly national and what is truly local.” Id. at 567–68.
83. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). In Morrison, the Court reinvigorated Lopez by striking down the
Violence Against Women Act for exceeding the bounds of the Commerce Clause, despite
findings documented in the legislative history that Congress thought would obviate Commerce
Clause objections. See id. at 614.
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Article I, Section 4 conflict could present the Rehnquist Court with
the same challenge it faced in Bush v. Gore: Does the Constitution’s
text provide power only to a particular part of state government, or
does it delegate power to the state as an entity? The same paradox
that scholars have recognized after Bush v. Gore could arise in
making such a determination.84
C. The Conflict between Textualism and Federalism Inherent in
Article I, Section 4
The Article I, Section 4 argument in Branch merits a careful
examination of the Constitution. For this purpose, this Note examines
two approaches embraced by members of the Rehnquist Court:
textualism and federalism. Frequently these two methods of
interpretation are considered similar or identical—the five members
85
of the Rehnquist majority frequently rely on both. In the abstract,

84. The paradox is that the conservative “states’ rights” judges will not hesitate to displace
the decision of a state government and impose national control when it suits their political
preferences. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 70, at 175 (discussing one caricature of the five judges in
the majority in Bush v. Gore as “departing from their long-held states’ rights principles” to
reach the political result they desired).
The cynical, political critique of Bush v. Gore––that the Republican Justices turned
their backs on their own ideology to provide a victory for a Republican president, see id., seems
equally applicable to Branch. There, the chancery court judge who attempted to draw the
congressional districts was a Democrat, whereas each judge on the three-judge federal panel
that denied the chancery court’s jurisdiction was appointed by a Republican president. See
Patrice Sawyer, Judges Set Redistricting Deadline, THE CLARION-LEADER (Jackson, Miss.),
Feb. 20, 2002, at 1A (emphasizing that a ruling against redistricting would serve Republican
interests, and identifying the political affiliations of the judges involved); see also E.J. Dionne,
Jr., Payback in Judges, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2003, at A21 (discussing Branch as an example of
judicial activism among Republican judges aiming “to remake the world according to the
specifications of Justice Antonin Scalia”); Richard A. Serrano & David G. Savage, Renewed
Focus on Scalia Trip, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2004, at A26 (discussing Justice Scalia’s apparent
change of philosophy vis-à-vis federal meddling in state redistricting disputes by first denying an
emergency stay and then authoring the majority opinion in Branch, which benefited Republican
Congressman Chip Pickering, son of Judge Charles Pickering, a longtime Scalia friend and
turkey hunting partner).
85. See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 918–19 (Scalia, J.) (describing as an “essential postulate[]”
the “incontestible [sic] [concept] that the Constitution established a system of ‘dual sovereignty.’
Although the states surrendered many of their powers to the new Federal Government, they
retained ‘a residuary and inviolable sovereignty[.]’ This is reflected throughout the
Constitution’s text . . . .”) (citations omitted); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 367 (1996) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (approving the Court’s refusal to uphold detailed regulations imposed by the
district court on Arizona’s state prisons and stating, in this connection, that “[i]t is a bedrock
principle of judicial restraint that a right be lodged firmly in the text or tradition of a specific
constitutional provision before we will recognize it as fundamental”); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 845 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (looking to the specific language of
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logic dictates that the two approaches frequently should yield the
same result; if federalism is the design underlying the Constitution,
the plain meaning of its text should yield a “federalist” result. More
specifically, it seems that a textualist approach to constitutional
interpretation frequently generates a pro-state autonomy view of
federalism.86
However, in the context of Article I, Section 4, the two
approaches yield opposite results. The “plain meaning” of
“Legislature” is just that—the legislature. Because Article I, Section 4
nowhere mentions state courts, they should play no part in
redistricting. Yet, viewing the situation in broader, federalist terms
counsels against this view. Redistricting is a state function: state
courts can play a role in this process as they do when interpreting any
law, and to remove a state entity in favor of a national entity violates
the federalist principle underlying Article I, Section 4.
II. THE TEXTUALIST APPROACH TO ARTICLE I, SECTION 4
Textualists believe that when determining whether an action or
law violates the Constitution, a court should look first to the
document’s text. This form of interpretation has been the topic of
much scholarly debate,87 but its underlying rationale is logical: where

the Constitution, concluding that “nothing in the Constitution deprives the people of each State
of the power to prescribe eligibility requirements for the candidates who seek to represent them
in Congress,” and determining that the Tenth Amendment reserves those powers to the States);
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567–68 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (basing the holding in part on the importance of
maintaining a “distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local”); Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457, 460 (1991) (O’Connor, J.) (“As every schoolchild learns, our
Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal
Government. . . . Through the structure of its government, and the character of those who
exercise government authority, a State defines itself as a sovereign.”); see also infra notes 121,
123 (citing federalist statements by members of the Rehnquist and Burger Courts).
86. I thank Professor H. Jefferson Powell for this observation. See also supra notes 79–81
and accompanying text (discussing cases favoring state autonomy).
87. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION
25–38 (1982) (examining the strengths and weaknesses of textualist interpretation); Ronald
Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 115
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION] (criticizing Justice
Scalia’s scholarly arguments for textualism); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS
REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 113–22 (1990) (criticizing textualism
as a mode of statutory interpretation); Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION, supra, at 65 (responding to Justice Scalia’s scholarly arguments for
textualism); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia’s Textualism: The “New” New Legal Process, 12
CARDOZO L. REV. 1597 (1991) (assessing Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence of statutory
interpretation).
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the Constitution’s “words are plain and clear, and [determinate] . . .
there is generally no necessity to have recourse to other means of
88
interpretation.” Justice Scalia celebrates textualism as his guiding
89
philosophy, and Chief Justice Rehnquist has spoken about the
danger of courts’ departing too far from “the language of the
Constitution that the people adopted.”90 Regardless of one’s opinion
of textualism, it is an analysis worth exploring for the purposes of
predicting the meaning that the Supreme Court will attach to the
word “Legislature” in Article I, Section 4.
A. The Literal Meaning: “Legislature” Means “Legislature” and No
Other State Entity
Looking only at the Constitution’s text, it appears that state
legislatures alone have been granted the authority to draw
91
congressional districts. As suggested by litigants and amici in Bush v.
Gore, a court could hold that “[s]tate courts may not invoke even the
state constitution to circumscribe this state legislative power.”92 Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s statement in Bush v. Gore that “[t]his inquiry
does not imply a disrespect for state courts but rather a respect for
the constitutionally prescribed role of state legislatures”93 seems
equally applicable in this context––state legislatures should act alone
in drawing congressional lines.

88. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 182 (Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833); see also McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27
(1892) (approving this maxim and highlighting that when words are ambiguous,
“contemporaneous and subsequent practical construction” of a text merits greater
consideration).
89. See ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION, supra note 87, at 3, 13 (defending textualism and claiming that those who
view the Constitution as “a charter for judges to develop an evolving common law of freedom of
speech, of privacy rights, and the like . . . . frustrate[] the whole purpose of a written
constitution”).
90. William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 698
(1976). For then-Associate Justice Rehnquist, Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
(1857), and Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), exemplify the perils that can befall the
nation if the Court abandons the Constitution’s text. See Rehnquist, supra, at 700–04.
91. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections . . . shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof . . . .”).
92. Brief of the Florida House of Representatives and Florida Senate as Amici Curiae in
Support of Neither Party and Seeking Reversal at 5, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00949); see also Brief for Petitioner at 47, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70
(2000) (No. 00-836).
93. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (emphasis omitted).
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The next question to ask is whether a state legislature may
delegate this power to another entity like a redistricting commission
or court. The strictest view of the Constitution prohibits the
legislature from delegation: the state legislature alone is given the
authority to determine the congressional districts, and any attempt by
another state entity to do so must be rejected. Another view is that
the legislature may delegate the redistricting power, but that the
delegation must be explicit. This leads to a very state-specific inquiry,
requiring the reviewing court to determine whether the respective
state legislature (or state constitution, or both) delegated its
apportionment authority. The broadest view of the text is that a
general authority of state courts to interpret state law through the
state constitution—recognized by the legislature—permits state
courts to hear redistricting disputes and use their equitable powers to
remedy infirmities. Under this view, regardless of the Constitution’s
delegation of power to state “Legislatures,” redistricting plans
operate like any other law passed in the state and are subject to
traditional judicial review. The authority for judicial review under a
state constitution or statute coexists, and does not conflict with, any
constitutionally granted right to the state legislature to redistrict.94
Another aspect of Bush v. Gore and U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
95
Thornton could play a role in this broad interpretation. If members
of Congress are federal officers,96 their selection is a process subject to
discrete federal constitutional requirements, like those used in
appointing presidential electors. The federal nature of congressional
seats removes all traditional aspects of state lawmaking and applies
strict federal constitutional requirements. This view comports with
the other specific constitutional requirements for electing members of
Congress.97 If drawing congressional districts implicates Article I,
Section 4, the literal requirement that only the “Legislature” draw the
districts is invoked, and no other entity may do so. However, one

94. See also infra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing the parallel nature of the
state and federal court systems, and the Framers’ belief that giving each system responsibility—
and at times autonomy—will enhance protection of constitutional rights).
95. 514 U.S. 779 (1995). In this case, the Court reversed Arkansas’ attempt to limit the
terms of members of Congress. See id. at 783.
96. See id. at 805 n.17 (“The Clauses also reflect the idea that the Constitution treats both
the President and Members of Congress as federal officers.”).
97. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of
Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States . . . .”); supra note 78
(discussing the relative weakness of this distinction).
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could argue that members of Congress are less exceptional than the
president. Under this view, the requirements of Article I, Section 4 do
not require divesting state courts of their preexisting right to judicial
98
review.
The second part of Article I, Section 4, permits congressional
99
regulation of House of Representative elections. Consistent with this
power and the Fifteenth Amendment, a federal court may use its
equitable powers to draw congressional lines under the Voting Rights
Act, if the legislature fails to do so properly.100 Additionally, the
Fifteenth Amendment and some of its supporting legislation, like the
Voting Rights Act, specifically remove some state discretion in voting
procedures.101 Viewed in this manner, a federal court could strip a
state court of authority to use its existing state equity powers absent
an express grant of such authority from the state legislature.102 A
federal court also could stop a state court from entering the
redistricting process if the state court violated the Fifteenth
Amendment or a federal law like the Voting Rights Act.
Although state courts could play a role if the state legislature
conferred redistricting authority to another entity, a federal court
could intervene whenever a state court’s interpretation of the
statutory redistricting scheme at issue “[did] not fall within the
boundaries of acceptable interpretation, but rather represent[ed] . . . a
gross deviation from the scheme outlined in the statute.”103 In these
circumstances, a federal constitutional question would be raised and
the state’s constitution would have no role to play whatsoever.104
98. For example, Members of Congress are elected by only one district of people and are
solely accountable to those constituents, whereas the president is accountable to the whole
nation and has wide-sweeping powers.
99. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“[B]ut the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter
such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.”).
100. See S. REP. NO. 94-295, at 19 (1975), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 785
(acknowledging that in “exigent circumstances, [a court may] actually fashion[] the
[redistricting] plan itself”); see also McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 148–49 (1981) (quoting
the Senate Report with approval).
101. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., Smith v. Clark (Smith II), 189 F. Supp. 2d 548, 554, 558 (S.D. Miss. 2002)
(declining to allow Mississippi chancery courts to invoke their equity jurisdiction to draw the
state’s congressional districts).
103. Epstein, supra note 70, at 619. Epstein uses this language in the context of defending
the Rehnquist concurrence in Bush v. Gore. See id.
104. See Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000) (vacating the
Florida Supreme Court’s decision partly because the Supreme Court was “unclear as to the
extent to which the Florida Supreme Court saw the Florida Constitution as circumscribing the
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B. “Legislature” as Part of a Wider Grant of Authority to States as
Entities
Even the purest textualist looks to the meaning of the language
in the Constitution as a whole, not just the lone word in a vacuum—
the search is for the meaning of the word as it applies to the text. A
textualist could argue that Article I, like Article II, “does not create
state legislatures out of whole cloth, but rather takes them as they
come—as creatures born of, and constrained by, their state
constitutions.”105 In Smiley v. Holm,106 the Court advised, “[w]herever
the term ‘legislature’ is used in the Constitution it is necessary to
consider the nature of the particular action in view.”107 In his Bush v.
Gore dissent, Justice Stevens argued that both Article II, Section I
and Article I, Section 4 “call upon legislatures to act in a lawmaking
capacity.”108 And in Grills v. Branigin,109 the district court rested its
decision partly on the fact that the state election board had no judicial
110
or legislative authority under the state’s constitution. Federalist No.
78 further reflects an understanding on the part of the Framers that,
in a republican government, judicial review would play a role in
construing the statutes of a legislature.111 Viewed in this light, a state
court has a clear role in construing the laws of the legislature, and can
therefore use its equitable powers to redraw a state’s congressional
legislature’s authority under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2”). In this respect, the United States Supreme
Court seemed to indicate that the Florida legislature did not confer authority on the Florida
Supreme Court to rule on the choice of presidential electors.
105. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 123 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106. 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
107. Id. at 366.
108. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 124 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109. 284 F. Supp. 176 (S.D. Ind. 1968), aff’d per curiam sub nom., Branigin v. Duddleston,
391 U.S. 364 (1968).
110. See id. at 180. (“Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution clearly
does not authorize the defendants, as members of the Election Board of Indiana, to create
congressional districts. This power is granted to the Indiana General Assembly and the Election
Board does not possess the legislative power under the Indiana Constitution nor does it possess
judicial power under the Indiana Constitution.”).
111. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(“The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts.”). Justice
Scalia endorses the use of The Federalist in searching for a textualist interpretation of the
Constitution, “not because [the authors] were Framers and therefore their intent is authoritative
and must be the law; but rather because their writings, like those of other intelligent and
informed people of the time, display how the text of the Constitution was originally
understood.” SCALIA, supra note 89, at 38. This view has been adopted by the Supreme Court,
at least in some decisions. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 910 (1997) (Scalia, J.)
(viewing The Federalist “as indicative of the original understanding of the Constitution”).
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districts if the legislature is unable to do so within the confines of
either the state or Federal Constitution.
The scant case law interpreting Article I, Section 4 reflects a view
that “Legislature” in the Constitution means a state legislature acting
in its ordinary, lawmaking capacity, as limited by its state constitution.
In Smiley, the Court permitted a governor to veto a redistricting plan,
stating, “the exercise of the [redistricting] authority must be in
accordance with the method which the State has prescribed for
112
legislative enactments.” Use of a voter initiative as “lawmaking
power” has also been permitted.113 However, this can lead to two
opposing conclusions. One conclusion is that—in contrast to a state
governor, whose signature the state legislature requires to pass any
new law—courts have no actual role in enacting legislation, and so
cannot act in a “legislative capacity” by drawing lines without express
permission of the legislature. Alternatively, one could conclude that
the normal role of state courts in construing and interpreting statutes
applies equally to redistricting situations—if the state courts have
equitable powers derived from their state’s constitution or laws, they
can act to redraw congressional districts to remedy constitutional or
statutory infirmity.114 One’s choice of interpretation in this regard
could make the finding of state court authority under Article I,
Section 4 dispositive.
However, the cases demonstrate that the Supreme Court has not
taken the most literal view of “Legislature.” In Baker v. Carr, Justice
Douglas explained that, with few exceptions, “the Court has never
thought the protection of voting rights was beyond judicial
115
cognizance.” There is nothing in these dicta to indicate that state
courts have any less “judicial cognizance” than federal courts. In
116
Growe v. Emison, the Supreme Court emphasized that both state

112. 285 U.S. at 367.
113. See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 568 (1916) (upholding an Ohio
initiative that enabled voters to approve or disapprove redistricting).
114. By its very definition, equity is not a lawmaking process; it is limited to the facts of the
particular case before the court.
115. 369 U.S. 186, 249–50 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring). The exceptions listed by Justice
Douglas included Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281
(1948), and South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950). In each of these cases, the Court (with some
divergence in terms of specific language) declined jurisdiction on political question grounds
(something the Court changed in Baker). For a succinct explanation of the political question
rationale, see Baker, 369 U.S. at 277–78 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
116. 507 U.S. 25 (1994).
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legislatures and state courts are proper “agents of apportionment,”
and that federal courts must defer to state action “where the State,
through its legislative or judicial branch, has begun to address that
highly political task itself.”118 However, the Article I, Section 4 issue
was not before the Growe Court—both parties had conceded that the
state court had jurisdiction to redraw the congressional districts.119
A strict textual approach to this issue may conclude that the
redistricting power belongs to the state legislature alone. From this
perspective, although state courts may hear challenges to
congressional redistricting schemes, they cannot actually redraw the
districts absent a delegation of authority directly from the state
legislature.
III. THE FEDERALIST APPROACH TO ARTICLE I, SECTION 4
Although the text of the Constitution seems to indicate that state
legislatures should act alone in drawing congressional districts,
federalism counsels against removing state courts from this process.
The Rehnquist Court’s “New Federalism” approach encourages those
evaluating the Constitution to “appreciate the significance of
federalism in the whole structure of the Constitution.”120 The Framers
embraced a system of dual sovereignty to protect the people;
therefore, the federal government should not interfere with the
traditional roles of state governments and vice-versa.121 Respect for
federalism requires respect for states as entire entities—“[t]he
different governments will control each other, at the same time that
each will be controlled by itself.”122 The states as entities have been
granted the authority to draw their congressional districts through
both Article I, Section 4 and Article I, Section 2; if the legislature fails
to redistrict properly, the courts of the state should have an
opportunity to correct the problems before the federal government,

117. Id. at 34.
118. Id. at 33.
119. See id. at 32 (“The parties do not dispute that both [state and federal] courts had
jurisdiction to consider the complaints before them.”).
120. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
121. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 841 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“That the States may not invade the sphere of federal sovereignty is as incontestable, in my
view, as the corollary proposition that the Federal Government must be held within the
boundaries of its own power when it intrudes upon matters reserved to the States.”).
122. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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123
through its courts, enters the dispute. Particularly in the redistricting
context, one commentator has complained that the difficulty of the
requirements of redistricting and the involvement of federal courts
“can only be described as a hostile takeover of the districting
process—a process the Constitution commits to the states—by the
federal judiciary.”124 Invoking Article I, Section 4 to keep state courts
out of the redistricting process will only perpetuate the coup by the
federal judiciary. In light of the federalist scheme of the Constitution,
Article I, Section 4 grants authority to state courts to review
congressional districts drawn by state legislatures. In this capacity,
state courts should also be permitted to use their equitable powers to
redistrict the state.

A. Analysis of Article I, Section 4
If a federal court strips a state court of jurisdiction over the
redistricting process in the name of protecting the state legislature,
the most likely result will be that the federal court itself will take over
125
the process. There is no doubt that the initial authority for drawing

123. The Court has specifically told federal courts to stay out of redistricting disputes to
further the spirit of comity and federalism. See Growe, 507 U.S. at 34 (applying Germano and
explaining that the lower court improperly established only a deadline for the state legislature,
“ignoring the possibility and legitimacy of judicial resolution” of the redistricting dispute); see
also id. at 33 (noting that “state courts have a significant role in redistricting”). This illustrates
part of the Rehnquist and Burger Courts’ approach to state-federal relations, and underscores
the Court’s belief that state courts play a vital role in protecting their citizens’ constitutional
rights. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999) (Kennedy, J.) (“We are unwilling to
assume the States will refuse to honor the Constitution or obey the binding laws of the United
States.”); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976) (Powell, J.) (stating that the Court is
“unwilling to assume that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to
constitutional rights in the . . . courts of the several States”).
124. Melissa L. Saunders, The Dirty Little Secrets of Shaw, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 141,
146–47 (2000).
125. If the state legislature has been unable to develop a redistricting scheme that can be
signed into law, a court will have to create a plan of its own. In this situation, the only question
is which court, state or federal, will be doing the line drawing. For this reason, forum shopping
in redistricting litigation is quite prevalent. See Pamala S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some
Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708 (1993) (“One-person, one-vote
provides a wedge for partisan participation in the litigation process, permits a variety of forumshopping stratagems, and, in combination with remedial doctrines, provides opportunities for
the two major political parties to advance conceptions of the Act that serve their partisan
ends.”); Michael E. Solimine, The Three-Judge District Court in Voting Rights Litigation, 30
MICH. J.L. REFORM 79, 101–04 (1996) (discussing forum shopping in redistricting litigation); see
also Note, Federal Court Involvement in Redistricting Litigation, 114 HARV. L. REV. 878, 880
n.24 (2001) (listing some recent examples of forum shopping in redistricting litigation).
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126
congressional districts lies with legislatures; state courts play a role
only in challenges to the plan developed by the legislature. In Branch
v. Smith, the federal court ignored the overall constitutional scheme,
which permits states to establish their own congressional boundaries.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has applauded state courts for their
efforts in settling redistricting disputes.127
Although the Court did not address the Article I, Section 4 issue
in Growe, the holding and dicta of Growe are instructive about the
Court’s skepticism concerning the role of federal courts in the
redistricting process. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
emphasized principles of comity and federalism in denying the federal
court’s effort to employ its own redistricting plan in place of the state
court’s.128 The Court equated “Germano deferral” with the Pullman
doctrine.129 As Justice Scalia succinctly explained, “Pullman deferral
recognizes that federal courts should not prematurely resolve the
constitutionality of a state statute, just as Germano deferral
recognizes that federal courts should not prematurely involve
130
themselves in redistricting.” This statement should not be ignored
when lower courts address the Article I, Section 4 issue.

126. See White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 794–95 (1973) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 586 (1964), for the proposition that “reapportionment is primarily a matter for legislative
consideration and determination, and . . . judicial relief becomes appropriate only when a
legislature fails to reapportion according to federal constitutional requisites in a timely fashion
after having an adequate opportunity to do so”).
127. See Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407, 409 (1965) (“The power of the judiciary of a state
to require . . . a valid redistricting plan has not only been recognized by this Court but
appropriate action by the States in such cases has been specifically encouraged.”); Md. Comm.
for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 674 (1964) (“We applaud the willingness of state
courts to assume jurisdiction and render decision in cases involving challenges to state
legislative apportionment schemes.”). Although both of these cases concerned state legislative
apportionment plans, the Court in Growe renewed its “adherence to the principles expressed in
Germano” in a case involving a state court’s involvement in creating both state legislative and
congressional redistricting plans. 507 U.S. at 34.
128. Growe, 507 U.S. at 35–36.
129. See id. at 32 n.1 (“We have referred to the Pullman doctrine as a form of ‘abstention.’
To bring out more clearly, however, the distinction between those circumstances that require
dismissal of a suit and those that require postponing consideration of its merits, it would be
preferable to speak of Pullman ‘deferral.’”) (citation omitted).
130. Id. Pullman abstention is invoked by federal courts to avoid ruling on sensitive areas of
state social policy. See, e.g., R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941)
(refusing to hear a claim that rules of the Texas Railroad Commission sleeping car trains
operated in a racially discriminatory manner because it presented an issue that “touches a
sensitive area of social policy upon which the federal courts ought not to enter unless no
alternative to its adjudication is open”). For a general overview of courts’ use of the Pullman
Doctrine, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 12.2.1 (4th ed. 2003).
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A recent state supreme court case, Alexander v. Taylor,
summarized its view of Growe’s command in this way:
The failure of a legislature to act is a violation of the state’s citizens’
constitutional rights under [Article] I, [Section] 2 and the
[Fourteenth] Amendment . . . . Such a failure is subject to redress by
the state court if it will act and only by the federal court if it will
132
not.

This view of the situation comports best with the Supreme Court’s
command; federal courts should defer to state courts unless and until
those courts fail to act on their citizens’ behalf. The Alexander court
looked to the command of Baker v. Carr as justifying its role in the
redistricting process: Baker v. Carr allowed courts, both federal and
state, to play a role in the redistricting process, and some of the
earliest cases following Baker seem rooted at least partly in Article I,
Section 4.133
The impending dispute over Article I, Section 4’s role in
redistricting litigation highlights an ongoing tension between states
and the federal government––one inherent in the Voting Rights Act.
The Act was passed in response to attempts by southern states,
including their courts, to dilute the voting power of minorities. There
is little dispute that the assertion of federal power to protect this right
was warranted.134 However, as long as the Voting Rights Act singles
out some individual states for special federal restrictions,135 it is
131. 51 P.3d 1204 (Okla. 2002).
132. Id. at 1209.
133. See id.:
Many state legislatures . . . routinely refused to reapportion themselves, and many
state courts . . . routinely ruled that they were powerless to do anything about it.
Thus, something had to be done and was done in Baker v. Carr. The [C]ourt in Baker
v. Carr also recognized that courts have jurisdiction in congressional redistricting
matters under [Article] I, [Section] 4 of the federal constitution, pointing out, “The
first cases involved the redistricting of states under [Article] I, [Section] 4.”
(quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 201 (1962)).
134. See Stephen B. Bright, Can Judicial Independence Be Attained in the South?
Overcoming History, Elections, and Misperceptions about the Role of the Judiciary, 14 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 817, 817 (1998) (discussing the history that southern states and their courts have of
“defying the rule of law, particularly federal constitutional law, in the areas of race and criminal
justice”); Robert J. Glennon, The Jurisdictional Legacy of the Civil Rights Movement, 61 TENN.
L. REV. 869, 870–86, 929–32 (1994) (arguing that these changes instituted by the Warren Court
that expanded federal involvement in state courts were arguably justified because of the
extreme injustice occurring at the time, but that—in light of the achievements of the preexisting
system of state-federal comity—the Warren Court’s actions should now be reined in to prevent
a permanent alteration of America’s federal system).
135. See supra notes 7 and 42 and accompanying text.
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particularly important for federal courts to observe traditional
principles of comity, not only out of respect for federalism, but also to
permit state courts to play the role in the enforcement of federal law
anticipated by the Rehnquist Court’s New Federalism.
B. Viewing Article I, Section 4 in Light of the New Federalism
Decisions
The Rehnquist Court’s New Federalism jurisprudence may also
inform the potential conflict between state and federal courts. If one
looks to the Supreme Court’s aggressive protection of states both in
terms of autonomy and in terms of viewing states as guardians of
constitutional rights, the likelihood of state courts being granted a
role in the redistricting process is more likely.
Although this Note will not go through various Supreme Court
opinions to prove this point, some of the Court’s language may prove
enlightening. For example, a majority of the current Court has stated
136
that “state legislatures are not subject to federal direction.” If state
legislatures are not subject to federal direction, why should a
perfectly competent state court, whose actions comport with federal
constitutional and statutory requirements, subject itself to federal
direction? Additionally, in the context of the Commerce Clause, the
Supreme Court has demanded a separation between “what is truly
national and what is truly local.”137 Numerous other cases support the
“residuary and inviolable sovereignty”138 of the states.139
In view of this case law, if the constitutional question raised in
Branch returned to the Supreme Court in the course of another
redistricting dispute, it could present the Rehnquist Court with
another opportunity to advance its New Federalist cause. In the
redistricting context, state courts could be given the opportunity both

136. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 912 (1997); see also New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) (“[T]he Constitution has never been understood to confer upon
Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress’ instructions.”).
137. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995).
138. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
139. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that Congress lacks
authority under Article I to abrogate states’ sovereign immunity from private suits in their own
courts); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 680
(1999) (insisting that “a State’s express waiver of sovereign immunity [must] be unequivocal.”);
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72–73 (1996) (holding that Congress lacks authority
under Article I to abrogate states’ sovereign immunity from private suits in federal court).
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to protect their own sovereignty and to safeguard their citizens’
constitutional rights.
C. Aspects of Competitive Federalism Served by State Court
Involvement
The concept of competitive federalism is noted best in Justice
140
Brandeis’s dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann: “It is one of
the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.”141 This aspect of federalism can affect state courts in
redistricting disputes: the courts can use novel state laws and state
142
constitutional interpretations to protect the rights of voters. The
prospect of this experimentation may be stifled if state courts and
state constitutions are removed from the redistricting process.
Competition for taxpayers among states can lead to a greater
protection of rights.143 In the redistricting context, for example, a state
may find that the equal protection clause of its constitution provides
greater protection of its citizens’ rights than the federal equal
protection clause.144
140. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
141. Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
142. Justice Brennan noted the importance of this element of federalism, claiming, “[s]tate
constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond
those required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law.” William J. Brennan, Jr.,
State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
Brennan noted the growing number of state courts “construing state constitutional counterparts
of provisions of the Bill of Rights as guaranteeing citizens of their states even more protection
than the federal provisions, even those identically phrased.” Id. at 495. State courts have
recognized rights as diverse as the right to possess and use marijuana at home, Ravin v. State,
537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975), to the right to an equally funded public education, Robinson v.
Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973). For a lengthier list of rights recognized by state courts (and
what one scholar perceives as a threat that judicial elections pose to these rights), see Paul D.
Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest State Courts, 61
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 99–107 (Summer 1998).
143. See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1484, 1498 (1987) (book review):
If a community can attract additional taxpayers, each citizen’s share of the overhead
costs of government is proportionately reduced. Since people are better able to move
among states or communities than to emigrate from the United States, competition
among governments for taxpayers will be far stronger at the state and local than at
the federal level.
144. Such a claim has succeeded in Alaska in the state legislative redistricting context. Kenai
Peninsula Borough v. State, 743 P.2d 1352, 1369 (Alaska 1987) (requiring proof of “a consistent
degradation of a minority’s voting power” to make out an equal protection violation under the
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Even if one applies the alternative view to competitive
federalism—that politicians will experiment less out of fear of losing
145
their jobs ––a positive result is yielded in the redistricting context. If
state courts are more political, risk-averse redistricting bodies, these
146
courts will, at the least, enforce rights as they currently exist.
Regardless, if state courts overstep their bounds through
experimentation that violates federal law or the Constitution, federal
courts can continue to provide a remedy to those whose rights are
violated by state courts. With federal courts acting as the extra level
of protection envisioned by the Founders,147 competitive federalism
demands permitting state courts to play a role in the redistricting
process.
D. Policy Considerations Supporting a Federalist View of Article I,
Section 4
Additional policy considerations support the federalist view of
Article I, Section 4.148 State court judges are often elected or subject

Alaska constitution, which is stricter than the Federal Constitution’s mandate). Plaintiffs
challenging state legislative redistricting in Texas have prevailed using the state’s Equal Rights
Amendment. See James C. Harrington & Judith Sanders-Castro, Legislative Redistricting in
1991–1992: The Texas Bill of Rights v. The Voting Rights Act, 26 ST. MARY’S L.J. 33 (1994).
Similar claims have been raised in state redistricting suits in other states. See, e.g., In re
Apportionment Law, 263 So.2d 797, 807 (Fla. 1972) (No. 42253) (declining to extend protection,
holding, “[t]here are no provisions in the Florida Constitution relating to apportionment of the
legislature more stringent than those of the United States Constitution”); Brief of Amici Curiae
Americans for the Defense of Constitutional Rights at 12, Stephenson v. Bartlett, 562 S.E.2d
377 (N.C. 2002) (urging use of the state equal protection clause to limit further the political and
racial gerrymanders in state legislative apportionment plans) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
145. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote
Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 594 (1980):
[T]he reelection motive, the lack of sorting by risk preferences, external effects, and
the impact of migration combine to prevent many searches from being carried out
and to bias those projects that are undertaken. If state and local governments are
supposed to be “laboratories,” then [the author’s] model predicts that few useful
experiments will be carried out by them.
(citing New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
146. These rights include, most crucially for the purposes of redistricting, the right to oneperson, one-vote representation highlighted in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and the
additional protections provided by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
147. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
148. For a contrary view, urging more active involvement of federal courts in redistricting
litigation, see generally Note, supra note 125.
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149
to recall by the voters of their respective states. Although historical
evidence indicates that electing judges violates the Framers’ concept
of an independent judiciary,150 the fact that elected judges may behave
more like politicians is ideal in the redistricting context: redistricting
is inherently political, and it makes sense for the more accountable of
the two judicial systems to enter this political thicket. If state court
judges give in to partisan temptations in redistricting their respective
states, there is a political solution for the people.151 Further, federal
courts are not above partisan temptation: In evaluating state
legislative redistricting plans, federal judges are much more likely to
rule against plans drawn by the party of which they are not members
than they are to vote against plans drawn by their own party.152
Although no data are available about federal judges’ rulings on
congressional redistricting plans, it is doubtful that such data would
show dramatically different results.
As Justice Ginsberg has noted, “the slim judicial competence to
draw district lines weigh[s] heavily against judicial intervention in
apportionment decisions . . . .”153 Although this is true and state courts
should not eagerly undertake this role, if a court must draw district
lines, a state court that is more closely connected to the people

149. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of
Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 725 (“[I]n only twelve states are most judges not electorally
accountable to the citizenry . . . [Many of these states] choose lower or local judges
electorally . . . .”).
150. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 111, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton)
(“Periodical appointments, however regulated, or by whomsoever made, would, in some way or
other, be fatal to [the judiciary’s] necessary independence.”); see also ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 269 (George Lawrence trans., Doubleday 1969)
(arguing that states electing their judges will ultimately discover the elections attack “not
judicial power only but the democratic republic itself”). For an analysis of elected state judges,
see Croley, supra note 149. Croley lists several historical reasons contributing to the rise of
elected state judiciaries: Marbury v. Madison, Jacksonianism, participation in politics by settlers
from the western frontier, judicial rulings favorable to creditors, resistance to the English
common law, and judicial corruption. Id. at 717. Although it is beyond the scope of this Note to
discuss, this history could lead one to believe that, contrary to much existing scholarly opinion,
having an election mechanism on state courts ultimately confers greater protection to the
judiciary as one entity because citizens feel they have at least one avenue of recourse (short of
constitutional amendment) against an otherwise independent branch of government.
151. Furthermore, a state court judge whose own congressional reapportionment plan
violates federal law or the Constitution can be subject to review by a federal court.
152. Randall D. Lloyd, Separating Partisanship from Party in Judicial Research:
Reapportionment in the U.S. District Courts, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 413, 417 (1995). No similar
study has been done with respect to state courts.
153. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 934–35 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

071604 WILSON.DOC

1396

9/17/2004 2:04 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:1367

154
appears marginally more
through election and geography
competent to do so. A state judge’s need to be more politically aware
of his state and community for reelection purposes will also aid the
judge in drawing district lines.155
Some call for the use of the public law litigation model in hearing
156
redistricting cases. A state court judge facing reelection would seem
more likely to evaluate the wide interests involved in redistricting
litigation commanded by the public law litigation model. A state
judge subject to reelection has the most to lose in drawing
congressional districts; therefore, even if a judge attempts to skew
district lines in a partisan manner, she would be best served to appear
to listen to as many affected parties as possible in the course of the
litigation. Additionally, state judges will want their treatment of
litigants and the overall tenor of their trials to appear maximally
nonpartisan. In this connection, the public law litigation model would
assist state court judges to pursue this goal. A federal judge, having
already secured life tenure, has less incentive to pursue such a novel
mode of adjudication.
Another reason to allow state courts to play a greater role in the
redistricting process is to preserve the integrity of the federal courts.
The political pressures inherent to redistricting schemes strain the
“least dangerous” 157 branch of government—as evidenced by federal
judges’ preference, conscious or subconscious, for their own party’s
158
redistricting plans. Federal courts will maintain their proper role by
providing an additional check against the potential excesses of state

154. Lower state courts have jurisdiction over smaller numbers of citizens and are therefore
literally “closer to the people”; obviously a state supreme court in a state with more than one
federal judicial district oversees a larger number of people than a federal district court in that
state.
155. Under the model suggested by this Note, citizens and academics alike can further test
their faith in their elected state judges, while maintaining the constitutional safeguard of federal
judges who, at least theoretically, are above the partisan fray of the suits before them if the state
court violates the Constitution.
156. See Note, supra note 125, at 899–900 (citing Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in
Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1290 (1976)). The public law model calls for a
“diffused adversarial structure” in which judges take a broader view of standing in hope of
facilitating a solution to a complex problem of social policy. Chayes, supra, at 1308. Although
the article addresses use of the public law model in federal courts, it concedes that
“corresponding departures from the tradition [judicial] model in the state courts” also occur. Id.
at 1284 n.12.
157. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 111, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton).
158. See supra notes 84 and 152.
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courts, and will also preserve their own political capital by showing
restraint before entering disputes.
When Article I, Section 4 is analyzed in light of the entire
Constitution, a more holistic meaning to the text emerges. Taken in
context, the meaning of “Legislature” flows from the federalist nature
of the Constitution and the transfer of power from the federal
government to the states (subject to the individual state’s own
constitution and delegations of power to courts). Both policy and
practical rationales support this interpretation. State courts should
play a role in the redistricting process at the state level, and federal
courts should not attempt to strip state courts of their authority in this
important, constitutionally guaranteed role.
CONCLUSION
Examining both textual and federalist approaches to Article I,
Section 4, reveals a conflict between the two interpretations that must
be resolved by courts. Courts should read the term “Legislature” as
used in this part of the Constitution taking into consideration similar
passages elsewhere and the structure of the document as a whole;
doing so fosters a broader, federalist conception of the state as an
entity.159 State legislatures have principal and initial authority to draw
congressional districts, but this authority is subject to review by the
160
courts of that state. If a state legislature has failed to redistrict its
congressional delegation properly, a state court may exercise its
equitable powers to redistrict as long as some power to do so exists
under the state constitution, or pursuant to a delegation of authority
from the legislature. Principles of comity and federalism require
federal courts to abstain from interfering with this process, unless and
until the state courts cannot or will not enforce legal redistricting
schemes.
The impending conflict surrounding Article I, Section 4 in the
redistricting context may manifest a surprising contrast between the
two often-similar positions of strict textualist and federalist
constitutional interpretations. Even a textualist, however, may view
159. Apparently the Colorado Supreme Court agrees with this assertion, because it recently
asserted jurisdiction over a redistricting dispute and rejected an attempt by the state legislature
to enact another redistricting plan (replacing the plan enacted after the 2000 census). See People
ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 1231 (Colo. 2003) (“[T]he U.S. Constitution does not
grant redistricting power to the state legislatures exclusively, but instead, to the states generally.
The state may draw congressional districts via any process that it deems appropriate.”).
160. This assumes a judicial review mechanism within every state constitution.
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Article I, Section 4 as conferring power on the state judiciary, even in
the absence of explicit language granting this power. Under this view,
power is initially conferred on state legislatures and then exercised in
the manner prescribed by the state’s constitution and laws, including
judicial action by state courts. However, if an interpretive conflict
persists, the federalist nature of the Constitution and the two
provisions granting states the authority to redistrict their
congressional seats command the conclusion that state courts may
assert jurisdiction over this process. In light of the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudential command for renewed comity and federalism by the
federal courts, a federal court should enter this political thicket only
after both the state legislature and its courts have attempted to
redistrict a state’s congressional lines.

